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FOREWORD 
What is a cartel? How is it refated to the trust and other forms 
of capitalist monopoly? What b its role in world trade? Is the cartel 
an instrument of industrial peace or of ccommic &? 
Thesc qudof ls  again uune fmard, as they always do whcn 
d g  eeonamic relations arc disturbed hy war or crisis. World 
War I1 has hen followed by a new upsurge of the dunmatic and 
mmmunist movements in many p of the world that beaten the 
wry b a ~  of the cartel system. The war has also r d k d  in impor- 
tant chanp among thc imperialist powers, changes that afEact the 
u1tirt prewar network of relations among monopolies of tht 
lading countries. 
In the midst of this strew and main of the world capitah sys- 
tem, many Eanciful rhowics about the role of the earotl again art 
paraded fwth. No matter that these thcoriw a w e d  in more or b s  
nimitar form in tht previous period, and have bctn thoroughly & 
proved by events. The old fantasy abut the possibility d organizing 
the world economy under the Icadership of the monopdics, which 
has proved so disastrous m Germany and Japan in the late war, re- 
appears today in the form of the pr-d docrrint, especially in 
Britain. h tbc United States, on tbe other hand, a program for world 
organization-that is, world dominat-wcs tke shape of 
an a n t i d  doarinc with its magic £ornula of free mtcrpk 
TbisbattEtdthttitans,somcappwinginthtgukoffrta 
enterprisers and others in American eyes as the devil's advocate for 
tht cartel q s c c m ,  has added to the @ d i n .  
The prcwat pamphlet attempts briefly and d y  in an introduc- 
tory way to Qhow thc basic rclaaon lxtwetn the trust and thc antel, 
and to dtsuibt the main aspects of the world carrel system prevailing 
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&re the war. Changes resulting from the war in relations among 
the monop~lyca~italist powers, various programs and theories now 
m t ,  the position of the Soviet Union and of the democratic move- 
ments in r&& to monopoly are treated in my book, World MO- 
aapoly and Pewe. 
JAMES S. AUBN 
The Cartel System 
I. WHAT IS A CARTEL? 
A cartel is a form of monopoly combination. Historically, it 
arosc in its presentday form only as monopoly capitalism dcvcloped 
from the carlicr stage of capitalist fret competition. As the concen- 
tration of production proceeded, and with it the centralization of 
ownership and control, the modern cartel appeared as one of the 
forms of monopoIy, developing simultaneously with the trusts and 
combines. Like the latter, it operated both on a domestic and inter- 
national scale. 
In his classic study, Impm;Ilism : The Highest Stage of Capi- 
dim, Ltnin summarized thc process by whch monopoly capital 
extended its domination, first at home and then on a world scale, 
as fouows: 
"Monopolist capitalist combines-+art&, syndicates, trusts- 
divide among themselves, first of all, the whole internal market 
of a country, and impose their control, more or less completeIy, 
upon the industry of that country. But under capitalism the 
home market is inevitably bound up with the foreign market. 
Capitalism Iong ago created a world market. As the export of 
capital increased, and as the foreign and colonial relations and 
the 'spheres of influence' of the big monopolist combines ex- 
panded, things 'naturally' gravitated towards an international 
agreement among these combines, and towards the formation 
of international cartels. 
"This is a new stage of world concentration of capital and 
production, incomparably higher than the preceding stage." l 
By 1916, when Ltnin wrote his Impm'ak'sm, monoply capital- 
ism, dcvelqing rapidly since the turn of thc century, had already 
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btcome w d  diikcntiatcd as "the h i g h  stage of capidism." The I 
trusts and combits had attained dominating positions ia the #r~no- 
mits of the leading capitalist countries, and had d l i s h d  inter- 
h k b g  connections aaoss national boundaries. Lcnin analyzed tbis 
phenomenon to show that the concentration of production and of 
capital was assuming world proportions. A? the same time, he 
stressed that this process, far from being EKaacful, p m d d  bg 
marts of struggle and wn9ict among the monopolies within tach 
*country and between the monopolies of the leading capitalist nations. 
While I.& gave main attention to the giant trusts and cam- 
bincs, as distioguishtd from tht cwcls, he a h  noted the inmasing 
rolc of the international cartel. T h e  international cartels which 
dominate the whole world market, dividing it 'amicably' among 
thcmsel~cs-until war brings about a rdvision-already number 
over one hundred!" he wrote? Since thtn the socialist revolution in 
the former Russian Empire removed a large and i m p o m  sector of 
tht world market from the orbit of capitalism. But within the -pi- 
& world sector the number of international cartels has i n d  
manifold, and their rolt has grown cnormausly. 
The d is one of the hrma of monopoly combination, but it 
has distinguishing faturcs which account for its i n h g l y  im- 
portant role in world capitalist rdations h t m  tht two wars. 
For our purpose wt may accept the &&cation of monopoly 
cambinations into thrct mahi pups: trusts (LDCT~US and amalga- 
mations), dints, and . As will be seen shortly, this is a 
rather rough separation and is largely f d ,  but it dots strye to 
draw certain ntcessarg and clemcntary d i s t i n h  A merger or 
wst is a complete &tion of a numbcr of companies, h which 
each lomi its identity and a new single h emerges. A wmbine is 
formed whcn tbe ownership of a number of conctms is interlocked, 
resulting in a d a d  h a n d  and comm& structm while otha 
advitits such aa production or plant retain their original idmtity. A 
d i n e  may a h  take the dorm of a single new tntcrprk in which 
t w o o r ~ c a m p a n k ~ o w n a s h i p a n d m n t r o L I n t h e ~  
the participating b n s  agrtt to ctrtaia d & n s  with respect to 
m a r m u c h  as p b 6 x i n g ,  production quotag allocation of 
m a r W u t  retain their h a n d  independence and identity of 
mul&uring 0pcrathL' 
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The latter is the distinction usually made between the ~arfd and 
other forms of combination. Thus, according to one cartel apt, 
"combhatians which involve the loss of financial independence lie 
entirely outside the cartel concept."' And another cartel stdent, 
esstntially agreeing with this view, d&cs tbt main fcatura of 
-& as 6ollows: (I)  as a relationship between several ecommic~lly 
independent profit-making units, as distinguished from combii- 
tions of a corporate type; (2) as cornpod of actud or potmtial 
compFtitors in a c& commodity or acrvice; and (3) as a private 
relationship, which distinguishes a artel from a govcrnmtnt corn 
moditp agreanen~~  
Actually, compIcte manufacturing in&@- is surdcrtd 
in artcI arrangements which set production and q r t  quotas. And 
ofcm cartel rcktions had to the dhhmcn t  of interroeking finan- 
cial interests among the cartd m&s, depriving them in varying 
degree of thtir complete financial indcpcndtncc. But there is an im- 
portant distinction, inherent in thwe dcfinitiom. It is that contrary 
to the pcoctss of amalgamation or tmstifimtion, tht formation of 
cartcls by no means i&cs tbc chinatian of a d i d  of interm 
k t w t n  the individual firms joining the cartel. When a trust is 
formed, comptition is completely eliminated b e e n  the u n h  in- 
volved in the new combination. But within the cartel arrangemen& 
the competitive struggle p m d a ,  although by more p a d  means, 
the participants having -tad certain conditions and limitations. 
Tht cartd has many forms and uses many devices, sordc marc 
restrictive, otlms leq ranging from trade mark and simple patent 
agreemen& to various measures for &g prices, sming production 
qmw, and allocating market territories. It may take the form of 
loost agreements only partidy &tin& the markczing activities of 
tht participants, or of a full-kdged @tion in which tbc members 
are bound strictly to rcgulatioas aikting all as- of their opera- 
tions. But whether in the k or tighter form of artel, the partici- 
pants retain their identity as separate firms, and remain more or lcss 
i n h h t ,  depending upon their own tconomic power and their 
ability to re& absorption by the more pwcrful man+. C a d  
m h  c o m t l y  wry on a suuggle within the artd mange- 
men?, some s&hg to atend their domination by ahrbing the 
lesstr companies, while urhers attempt to p e t  &cmdp# h m  
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bdng f d  into combinadoas where they will lost their indtpen- 
dcnce complcrdy. 
Thus, the c a r d  may be considered the high road leading from 
fiae enterprise to monopoly combination. It is an imptaut medium 
through w&ch tht monopolies extend thcir domination of the 
domestic and world economy. Thh is cxrmpI&ed on a national 
scaie by the trade assmiation,* through which the leading monopolies 
in tach industry or branch of production estaMish certain uoiform 
pdidcs to which the weaker and smaller producers art k c d  to 
a k .  In Germany, the wade asxiations provided the ins~umcnt 
£or the most complete cardhtion of the economy under the lcad- 
trship of the giant manopoly combinations. A similar role is per- 
f o r d  by the trade m i a t i o n s  of England and the United States, 
mart pronounced in the former, but in both muntries serving as the 
ecntral medium of cartehtion? 
The international cartels are an extension of the domestic cartels, 
but in another form. The main pariidpants in the world cam1 sys- 
tcm art usually the pmH monopolits, which have already come to 
dominate the domatic fiJd through thtir own direa control of pr* 
duaion or by virtuc of their contml of the trade associations. A 
partidpaat in a world catel can exert his power in the allocation 
of markets ody the cxtcnt that he has alrmdy gained a dominant 
position in the home mark& However, it is not unusual for uade 
asdations in which control is shared by two or more dominant 
firms to d h h  sptcial export associations to participate in a 
w o r l d ~ J n t h e U n i t c d s m t c s s u c h g p o r t c a r e t l s a r c ~ ~  
considered pcmissiblc under the Webb-Pommne Act; and in Brit- 
ain, cspchlly during the war, thc d o d c  aimciatiom formed many 
export cartels in preparation foi the pawar struggle for markets. 
T& d i h c k h  already made bawtta the c a d  and other forms 
of monopoly combinadon is an irnpmtant one and is basic to an 
analysis of the international cartel mwcment. But it must nor bc 
taken too f o d y .  All forms of monopoly represent mentially 
the samt process of centralization of ownership and control, but 
atd i jknt  levels.Thecartclisthclowestform,thc vustormugcr 
'In the United Stws, d g  to a shrdy by tbe Taaporary National 
E e o n d c  W t t t e  (TNE), there are 8,000 trade ~ U M S ,  of 
rPhieh~artnntioPal ia8dope.  
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the highest and the combine the intermediate form of combinah. 
Cartels are part of the general process towards combination and 
amalgamation. This was placed quite clmrly by one of the leading 
world txtclists, the o r g a b  of the giant British chemical trust, Sir 
&d Mond (Lord M&m) : 
"I use the word cartel to indude fusion, pooling arrange- 
ments, quota ~gcmenu and prkt convmtions, because a 
c a r d  is protean in its form. . . . In an ultra technical way, a 
cartel may be d&ed as a combination of producers for the 
purpose of ~egdating, as a 4% production, and, frequently, 
prices. That does nut involve giving up the identity of the d8- 
fercnt firms. It is not usually made for a pc'iod lasting more 
than a limited time. It docs not necessarily arry  with it, though 
in some cases it d m ,  joint d ing  agencies. &metimes, -,-it 
carries with it quotas of production. But all this is, perhapq too 
narrow a ddinition. Thc Gumans have a term ZnCcrc~sm- 
gmeinschaj3 . . . a union or similarity of interest. The great 
German Dye Trust [L G. Farben] started with what t h y  call 
Intcressm-gemn'mchafb. When &st formed it was a fairly loost 
combination ta regulate production and p r i m  It hm been sub- 
~br'twtcd dace by am absolute md complete fusion mad exchange 
of shares-whaa we would cull a mmpkte amalgum&'m- 
whkh is the liffsl and most c~mpletc fm of my kind of c a d  
whid cun &e imagined." (Emphasis mine.-JSA.)' 
It is thraugh such a "union of interest"-imposed by the more 
powerful u p  the less powerful--dltarting as a "simple" d ar- 
rangement, tiaat many of the super-comb- have been formed. But 
to see this as part of the process of comvation, as the M o n  of 
dtsclopment, without at the same time geeing the contradictions and 
a&ct within this pmess is to recognize only half the truth. For 
the -el is tsstntially an unstable and temporary arrangement, an 
armistice or a truce bdwten the monoplies witbin a country or d 
various countries. It is a means of tmporarily regulating the struggle 
which has become too costly, of hitting ofl agreements between the 
giant competitors until such a time as new economic and poliihd 
developmen& leading to a new rclation of Sopccs, ausc the struggle 
to be resumed in a more open form. On thh point ah the cartel 
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magnate aIrcady qwtcd prwod quite @KC. Discussing the d S -  
cuItg of obtaining a free cxchatlgc of taehnologicd information 
among c a d  m e m b  Sir Alfred M o d  wrote: 
'% artel or combination which exists ody  for a Wttd 
number of ycars is in d t y  nothing more than an armistice 
in industrial warfare; and people arc not going to hand ovcr 
anns and methods of wadart to hose who in a few years may 
bc fighting them again." * 
The combine is tbe more stable and the trust the most stable 
form of monopoly cambination. International carttb arc temporary, 
fluctuating, and unstable combinations, although some may prove 
more enduring than others. They function in the rcatn of inter- 
monopoly and inter-imperialist mnflict. The presence or the absence 
of cart& in this or &at sphere reflects the state of war or relative 
peace among the monopolies on a world scale, except in those &Ids 
whae a giant monopoly or a closely interlocked group has been able 
to establish its hegemony without the kdt of carttl arrangements. 
It would be erroncorn to think of inter-monopoly relations in 
paal ,  and the meh in particular, only in the narrow economic 
m, only as a development taking place separately from basic - 
nomic and poliricaf world relations. The great conatration of eco- 
nomic power in ach of tht lea- capitalist countries, the met; 
tiom established h e e n  the monopoly groups of various countries 
and the rivalries among them, a&a all politid arrangements be- 
tween nations. The level of aconomic developrntnt within a country, 
the rate of growth in this or that branch of the economy, penetra- 
tion abroad through the export d capital and the establishment of 
spheres of duencc, the +on of wfonies, the military power 
of the nations, the level of govcrnmcnt intervation and control in 
the & m d c  economy and in foreign ecommic relatiow rhe foreign 
@CS of g o v ~ e n t 4  arc ingredients, somttimts hidden, at 
other times quite o p ,  of the c a d  fwmatioa 
For thee reasong the m d  srnrccurc k a m e  an txtrrmcly 
k t i v e  indicator of the actual economic and political power rela- 
tions among tbe leading apitalist countries, and between various 
bran& of industry and trade. For a given period, the cartel smm 
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ture registers the status of the inter-monopoly m g g h  for world 
markets among the chief contenders. The collapse of a cartel in one 
field indicates that the struggle in that sphere has again broken out 
hto tht open. The restoration of the cartel, or tht creation of a new 
one, records the o u t m e  of the suugglt, sign%- that a wet bas 
bccn eb l i shcd  until uneven economic dtvclopment as bawecn 
countria and industries or ncw political upsets bring about still 
another struggle. 
Not only individual c a d s ,  but the cartel mwturc as a wblc  
have bcea basically revised or even temporarily suspended during 
@ads of economic crisis or war. After the grcat crisis broke out 
in rgag most c a d  &cly cased to function for a brief period, 
lading one British eeonamist to remark that t .  drastic plunge of 
prices had "cawed the virtuaI breakdown of almost all the existing 
control s c h w ,  and for a short time in the spring of ~ g p  it looked 
as if tbt individualist Iaissez-fmre system would be restored." Bur 
even in the course of the crisis th; cart& bad kgun to re-form, 
responding to the new relationship being d l k h t d ,  as the crisis 
a&& various countria and industries differently, Ervin Hmer, 
an American cartel student, notes that as a result of thc crisis, "al- 
most all international control schemes (cspecidy, the p t e r  part 
of the international cartels) which cxistcd before 1930, were reshapbd 
in the m n d  interwar decade." 
In the two world wars, cartel arrangements were as a rule sus- 
pended, although in both wars some international, cartels continued 
to operate But as a whole, the prewar cartd structures lost their 
significance, and cartel arrangements were held in abeyance to await 
thc new relations which would be established as a result of the war. 
During the world wars, markets were wmp1ctdy disorganized, and 
the basic induswks devoted entirely to war production no longcr 
found necessary the regulation of capacity and markets provided by 
cartels. In each the consolidation of victory presented new 
problems, and the political devcIopments merging from the d a  
new cirtrumstanccs which had to bc taken into account in the re-form- 
ing of h e  d struaure. 
In their broadcx sigtdcance cards r& the whole interplay 
of monopolistic forces and of inter-imperialist r&tions. 
Cartel experts disagree sharply on which mompo1y combinations 
s h o d  be considered carpels. For legal reasons-to avoid p r w u -  
tion uadtr the American anti-trust laws-the economists of tht trusts 
hold that tht patent licensing agreement and the combine arc nor, 
pmperIy speaking, cart&. But since patent agreements p o t m ~  all 
the attributes of a cartel arrangement among iadcpdmt concerns, 
and since the combine is a transitional form bctwtm the cartel and 
the trust, they can be p r o ~ l y  included in the cartel conocpt. W y  
iudcpendent economists agree with Corwin D. Edward% for a time 
chairman of the Policy Board of the Anti-Trust Division, in clad- 
fying cart& into three main groups: the cartel a ~ a t i o n ,  the patcnt 
agreement, and the combint10 
In the first group m y  be included the simple price, des, trade- 
mark, specialization, and marketing agreements bctwten a number 
of firms. AIso in this category art the informal w & c s  and lame 
asmiations operating under "gentIemenYs" agreements. Thc arrange- 
ments are very diverse, varying according to industry or trade. A 
higher form of this type of arrangement is the ding syndicate, 
which acts as a central agency for its members and is usually author- 
ized m regulate output and prices. Tk highest form is the doscly 
knit association, which usually has a central agency empowered 
to carry out and enforce the agreement. 
An example of the somewhat Iooser type of asmiation in a very 
competitive field was the North Atlantic Conference, which divided 
up shipping between tbc German and Angl~Amcrican intcrcsts, 
i d u h g  16 of the biggest international companks. Typical of the 
mort completely formed cartel association was the International 
RaiJmakers Association which controlled over 85 pu cerrt d capid- 
ist world production of rails* It allocated world markets by setting 
quotas for its m c m h  in Britain, the Unittd States, Germany, 
France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and a Cemal Europmn pup." 
The International Copper Card excmplifics the high degree of 
centralized control txt& by fully dcvcioptd a t e l  assaciatiom 
RECstablishod in 1935 under an agreement subsequently extended 
until rgqr, the Intanatid Copper Cart4 ewerod produdm and 
distribution of the main copp cornpanics operating outside tht 
I2 

able part of the inttrnahal trade of the world bt brought 
under a high degree of commdty control, but the distinction 
ktwtcn cartels and commodity agreements will b m e  pro- 
gressively less meaningful." l4 
To classii all government commdity agreements as cartels is 
incorrect and mn£using. In a purely form4 mse, both private car- 
t& and inttr-government commodity arrangcments can be cladkd 
as commdty agrwncntq and both often use thc same devices to 
achieve their objdvc,  such as production a d  export quotas, and 
prim %wing. All or some of thcst mcthoda were used in the inter- 
government agreements on coffee and wheat. Similar devises arc 
used by the gavcrflment to regulate agricultural production and 
prices in the Unit& Statts. 
Some government m d t y  agreements arc mrtels and othm 
are not. The distinction is to be found in whether tht a-ent rep 
restati primarily an assuciation of monopoliists (with government 
partidpation or s p d p ] ,  or w h e k  it performs some other, 
non-monopoly function. Thw the government agreements on d c c  
a d  wheat caanot, properly spealrig, be considered cartels, although 
they ust similar dcvides, agreements represent govmamult 
intervention h the economy for the purpose of regulating the produ~  
tion and marketing of products which are produced by innumerable 
growers. Such agreuncnb may optrate in practice more to the ad- 
vantage bf the largest planters and of the marketing and financial 
con- than to the hundreds of thousands of d and madim 
producers. But that does not of itself m a n  that they are agrccmeats 
of thc m o n o p l y ~ e l  type. 
On the & band, cartehi of the monopoly type, especially sing 
World War I, have kcasingly been formed with the sponsorship 
of governmenu and sometimes inwlvad their dirm participation. 
A wd-known emxnplt is the International Tin Cornmitt- which 
was organid by the British and Dutch govemmcnts when tht 
private monopoly producers failed to read agreement. Menhership 
in the mmmittec and restridom of output were made camputsory 
by law, and national export quotas were set £or the producers in 
British Malaya, Bolivia, the Dutch East Indics and Nigeria, A simi- 
lar a r m p e n t  was tht International Rubber Convention, and to a 
lcscr mtnt tbc sugar agreement to which the United State govern- 
'4 
ment was a partner. Governmentaganid or sponwrad cart& of 
this type usually involve raw materials of which the o u p t  or pse 
casing is already highly monopolized. 
In a r d a n c c  with its economic policy, a pernment may spon- 
sor d o m d  and international cartels in industrial pducta  aa w& 
In the United Statcs for a brid period, during the #.xmomic mi& 
of the Wa, the goucmment promotmi domestic cartels under 
N,RA. Code* In Gumany, even before Hider came to power, rhe 
&-tion of the economy pracdtd under govcrnmtnt aegis; 
and in England the government for some time has followed a prrt 
cartel policy. For certain important industrial materials, mrch as 
mppcr, the production of which was greatly increased during the 
war, the United Statcs may conclude commodity agreemen@ or 
o&ally s p m r  private cartel arrangements to take cart of the sur- 
plus s t d s  and allocate the new production. Negotiations regarding 
copptr were rtported under way at the end of 1944 among thc gov- 
ernments and corporations m c ~ r n e d . ~  Actually, tht over-all ten- 
dency of dtvdopmcnt is for growing government intervention in one 
dorm or anather in the cconomy, including the cartel system, on r 
national and international dc. 
The patent-Easing agreement assumed inamsing impwtancc 
with the growth of new industries, the "laboratory indusuiqn in 
which constant m r c h  for new materials and proccssts was neca- 
sary. It is dm important in the older industries whm new processes 
and new materials were introduced.* The pat- a g r m  is 
prdably the most common form of participation by American firms 
in inunmiod a d s ,  one of the m n s  for this being that such 
arrangements can bt morc easily upheld against the provisions of 
the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. And it is for this reason a h  that the 
corporation ceommists and lawyers contend that the patent license 
does not, properly speaking, belong to the cartel category. But as 
Edwards shows in his study, agmmtnts by which patents art li- 
d out to participating firms usually docate salts territory, and 
set prices, produetion quotas and marketing rules for she product 
fm which the patent is issued. AU kin& of variations occur. 
Indwtrits ~II which pamt agreements play a most impwtant role im 
dudc: chcmica, electrical and cl& equipment, machine, mdlrugy, 
radio, & d u a l  d s  a d  synthetics telegraphy end t e l epky .  
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An outstanding example of an all-indusive agreement of thb 
type was the arrangement between du Pont and Imperial Chemiml 
X n d d  (I.CJ.), the British monopoly, wvtring practically all 
their products. The agrmmmt was part of a whok network of pacts, 
resulting in the division of the world market among the chunical 
rn of Britain, Germany, and the United Smtts. Imperial Chuni- 
cab had a p a d d  agmment with L G. FarWdustrie, tbe giant 
GaPzan monopoly, and a h  with the Belgian Solvay, in which the 
comact with du Pont had to bt propcrly proteetad. Thug an agree- 
ment ~ W Q ~ D  L C I  and L G. Farben on a specific product had to 
take into account the W t i m  alrtady a g e d  upon b e e n  I.Cd. 
and du Pant, And similarly, without necessarily entering into a 
diract pact with 1. G. F:arbtn, du Pont was obliged to honor the divi- 
sion of markets bctwccrr the German uust and 1.C-I: Actually, ac- 
cording to the -t: of Justice records, a gentlemen's agrm 
mcnt did exist k w e m  du Pont and I. G. Farben whereby they were 
o m  to give caeh other first option on patents and pracesses not 
already promised to others. In &ect, the arrangements between 
LGJ, I. G. F& and du Pont resulrcd in a world &mid card ,  
covering ovw four hundred products ranging h drugs to muni- 
tiom and strategic war mattri&,16 
The struchlrt btcomes very complicated, as arrangements on 
sp&l pducrs also involve other leading monopolits, which in turn 
crtmd the agreemat through a whole maze of a&atQd compania. 
Standard Oil's patent qpeumnts with I. G. Farben on ~oooaane 
gasoht, synthetic rubber, and oil affected the auto, aviation, and 
chcmical industries of the country?T Such arrangement8 arc compli- 
ated further by cxchanp of shares, joint ownership, c m  inter- 
and yarious forms of d i e s  o h  c s t a b h d  in connection with 
the working out of patent a g r m t s .  
It is o h  d&h to dctcrminc where a cartel ends and a com- 
bine begins. As heady pointed out, cartels tend to develop into 
combines, as the more powerful gain control over the weaker ma- 
bas, or as jointly owned c o m e  art established to exploit a 
market commonly shared, For example, du Porn and I.C.I. formed 
the Canadian Industriq Ltd, as a joint subsidiary to act as their 
exclusive agency in k d a .  In Brazil and Argentina, tbe m e  trusts 
organid n h i d k i e s  known as Duped, which in turn set up a 
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rub-network d monopoly in thew countries tbrougfi part ownership 
in &a him. Ofttn a car tc lw  a g r m  among trusts cven- 
tually Itads to a relation baw#n thcm aa m e  s u d  in 
taking over a greater share of the ownership and control of the 
competing corporation. This is exemplified in the relations bmvetn 
the G e d  Eleaic Co. and the AE.G. (General El&c of 
-Y) : 
"In xgzz  the GE. and tht A.E.G. concluded a mycar agrtt 
mcnt which to a certain went restored the pre-war rtlatiansbip 
between the two firms. The agreement provided for thc ex- 
change of patents and the division of thC world market whereby 
GX. 'obtained' the markets of the USA, b a l  America, and 
partly Canada, while the Central and East European markets 
were allocated to the German trust. Unlike the position in pre- 
war times, Bowtver, the A.E.G. ceased to be an qua1 partici- 
pant in this agreement. As far back as 1920 the h a 1  Electric 
Co. acquired 25 per cent of the newly issued stock of the 
A3.G. This wnnection was grearly strengthened in I- when 
the American rmst taok over 30 per cent of all thc shares d 
the German monopoIy!' l8 
Hcrc the dividing h e  k t w t t n  a cartel agreement and a com- 
bine bemmts pretty vague. Yet rhm arc not the only c o d o m  
of General Electric. It also has a conmlling interest in the p m d d  
Mm*Vickers firm in Engknd, as well as direct investments in 
General Electric, Ltd, and in a leading French and two Japanese 
eltctrical equipment m c e r a ~ . ~  This is not all. Also linked with 
GX. through interlocking controIs of thc Morgan group is tht In- 
ternational Telephone and Telegraph Co, which holds most of the 
st& of many cabk, radio communications, and telephone corn- 
p i e s  throughout the world. And the 1. T. & T. also owns st& 
of the International Standard Electric Corp., whkb is a holding com- 
pany controlling h n s  throughout the world tngagd in the manu- 
facture of communications aquipmcnt. This super-combine in the 
c l o d y  related fields of d%ctricaI equipment and communications is 
a h  a more permanent type of cartel arrangement, hlstered by 
direct ownuship participation in hundreds of separate corn@ in 
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many countria. Cartel arrangements of a patent-licensing type exist 
bcmca tbe firms in tbe combinc, markets are divided among than, 
production quotas are set, and so forth. 
This super-world c o d i c ,  in i d  still r&g many fcaturesr 
of the international cartel, in turn eaters into artel relations with 
athcr world combines of a similar character. In thc electrical equip- 
ment 6cld thcre arc two lesser world combines. Wminghoust 
Manufacturing Co. maintains h e  connections with the leading 
German, English, French, and Japanese producers not indudtd 
in the GX. combine. N. V. Philips, incorporated as a Dutch com- 
pany but whose ownership thc war has rendered rather o h c ,  is 
also a world holding company of giant size, antrolling same eighty 
companies engaged in the manufactwe and distribution of radio 
quipmen& &ark light buIbs, and other dectrical supplics in many 
countries, mmtly in Europe and Latin America. Thus, world car- 
tdization in this field results from agreement among rhrct giant 
combines within each of which d - t y p e  arrangements exist ide 
by side with exchange of sharw and inttrlocking ownership. 
Intcrrdatdd stock ownership, holding cornpanics in t h d v e 8  
small but controlling tremendous aggregata of productive plant, 
h~erkking directorates, family controI, and other devices u d  to 
build up corporate giants within a single eounuy are also employed 
on a world d e .  Many instances can be given of nominally hde- 
pendent companies, entering into cartel or patent agreements, which 
are a d y  under a single directorship. Aluminum, Ltd, of Canada, 
for txampk, is controlled by the same three W e s  which own 
the Aluminum Co. of America. Whilc such dcrrelopments art char- 
actcristic d all countries of monopoly capitalism, tbey arc especially 
marked in the Amcriw corporate structure and its extensions on 
a world scale.* 
An account of how a giant combine is formed was 
'The developmeat of giant d i e ,  of course, is not pe&ly 
Amchn, U n h u ,  the British matgarine and fats combine, orwuols 400 
cmnpania in 51 counIric8. The Krcuger Match Co, @re its collapse 
during the world momk crisis, owned 150 m a d  faetdes in 35 wun- 
tries, enjoying a match monopoly or a share in tbc mtc monoply in 
15 auutriq and had vasr holdings in mi- w d - p u l p  plants, tlaetrica 
+acting, roitroada and other fields. 
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given at  the Seaate harings on titanium, the most vsluable and 
useful of all white pigments for paints, rubber product% g h q  paper, 
enamel, and otba mareri&.aO The titanium d involwa thc 
leading producers in the United Statts, Britaio, Germany, France, 
Canada, and Japan. They art linked not only by a mics of tight 
agreements among them to govern markets, prices, and production 
but also through inwlmking o w d p .  The c o m b  was formnd 
through establishing jointly ownad companies in various countries. 
Its history is instnrctiw. 
The leading American participant is National Led  Co, listed 
among the two hundred largest industrial corporations.* In 19x6, 
National Lmd started t o d  wntd of titanium by buying up the 
Titanium Pigments Co, formed that year to exploit the process in- 
vented by two Amtrican chemists. In the matime, another method 
of making the pigmcnt was diseovcrcd in Norway by Gustav Jebsea, 
who formad Titan Co., A. S. Control ovcr Jebstn was cstablishad in 
1ga7 when National Lead purchased &7 pet cent of Titan's stock, aud 
acquired tht major interest in a French company which had been 
set up by Jebsen. Two years later, National Lead and Jcbsen or- 
ganizcd ~ i t k  Co, h, as their joint holding agency for all foreign 
interm. Through this holding company they then organized a new 
company in Germany togcther with I. G. Farbcn, to which was 
assigned tbt mclusivt territory of most of Europe and the Far East. 
But the titanium monopoly thus established was threatened 
when still a third pr- was invented by a scientist workii in 
France, and a company was or@ there to liceme out his 
patents. In the Unitmi States thm patents were eventually taken aver 
by du Poat, whereupon National Lead entered into a deal with du 
Ponr. The a g x m t  maintained the monopoly ovcr titanium 
within the country betwctn thc two, but granted the right to all for- 
eign pawlrs to Titan Ca, the National Lead holding subsidiary. 
The threat having been averted at home, a new danger sooa ap 
ptared in the form of a British company which w a s  independently 
exploiting the F m h  patents, The problem was salved by the or- 
ganization of British Titan Products, Ltd, set up jointly by National 
Among the many interests of National Lead are the Patino Tin min# 
in Bolivia 
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Lad, Imperial Chemial Industrica, and two smaller British com- 
The nea 6cld to bc conquered was Canada, The mmt important 
chemical con- there is Canadian XnduSuicp, Ltd, owned jointly 
by du P a t  and LCI. Here, tm, a new wmpany was organbed, 
Canadian Titaniam Pigments, Ltd, as the joint dsidiarp of Can- 
adian Industries and National Lead. However, it trampirod that tht 
French process had a h  turned up in Japan. Tbis time National 
Lead had to call upon T. G. Farbcn, to which it had assigned ex- 
dusivc Far Eastern right8. Through their jointly owned German & 
sidiary, National Lmd and I. G. F a h  f o m d  a new company in 
Japan together with a lading Japanese chemical concern. 
Through joint ownerabip combinad with tight patent agrca 
m e ,  National Lead dominated the world titanium market. In 
tbt purdy formal sense, it can be argued that this is not a cartel, 
since none of tht par&pating companies retained their identity of 
ownership in the ntw arrapanies set up to exploit the pr- for the 
manufacmc of titanium. Achrdy, it is a a d  become a conhime, 
crated by National Lead, du Pont, I. G. Barben and Imperial Chem- 
i d s  for the joint expIoitation of markets for a single p ; o d ~  It is 
a higher, more integrated form of the d than the c a d  associa- 
tion or the simple licensing agreement. The aim d the cartel is 
achieved much more &ec.tively and &ently. The titanium corn- 
bine reprtscnta a step towards complete amalgamation, which, as 
the British &emid magnate said, "is thc final and mose complete 
form of &el which can be imagined!' 
An iaevibbIe result of the growth of monopoly during the inter- 
war yaus was the increasing control wer world trade and suviccs 
by the c a r d s  and other monopoly combinations. As bnopoIy more 
and more superseded he compttition in the home market $ simul- 
mmmdp came to dominate the world market as well, The con- 
eentrahn of production and ctnaalized wntrol in thc basic export 
idustrim, rht srdzurt by the monoplies of sources of raw materials 
in tht ooIonics and dcptndcnt nations, and the exmaion of mrprate 
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intermu on a world scalc, led to monopoly cantrol of world trade. 
This gtncraI mdusion is substantiated by tk weal& of data 
available on the operations of the world trusts and combines and the 
cartel arrangements between them. Voluminous sttldics on the trusts 
and monopolies, and in recent years especially the work of the Tern- 
porary Natiod Economic Committee in the United Stam, record 
the growing power and extension of the corporate system on a na- 
tional and world scale. Side by side with the growth of the tmits, 
the cartels have multiplied to such an extent that the editors of 
Fwtunc found that "by 1939 the cart& had reached numbers beyond 
thc ability of any m a t  world survey to tabulat~."~ 
According to one listing, which did not indude patent a m -  
mtnts and the loose typt of carid associations, there were 114 inttr- 
national c a d  in rgrgP A later survey placed Ehc minimum num- 
ber of c a d s  infimihg European trade in 1938 and 1 9 9  at X J O O . ~  
The Kilgore Committee of tht United States Senate has listed 63 
American cornpaties which in 1937 had cartel agreements with I. G. 
Farbm.= h r d i n g  to a tentative listing of tht Anti-Trust Division, 
rog American iirm participated in 179 international cartels. But such 
figures cau give only a faint iadiation of the actual extent of the 
cartel system, which indudes hundreds and thousands of patent 
agreements and conventions of various types. Somc approach corn- 
p k  control of a product, others involve only partial control. Somc 
cart& servc merely as a means of extending contra1 over the laser 
@ums by a dominant trust; others arc primarily a medium 
through which a number of big producers "regulate" competition 
among thdvt s .*  
*Par d s  w h i i  hnvt assumed a more d d i d  form, ~~g 
control mm or lcss mmpletdy over production on a regional or w d  
dc, it is possible to daExminc with g~ exactitude thc proportion 
d tht world market controlled by them. Thus, among the most impor- 
tant mtth are: tht capper d, ~oavdfiag go per  eat of world pr* 
duction in xgp; rail d, ovEr 6 per cent in rgp;  tin cartel, 83 pu cent 
in 1932; el& bdb c a d ,  go p r  ~ e n t  in 1934; rubbtr c a d ,  97 per cent 
in 1936; Eurdpcan stctl carttl, 45 p cent in 1936; spthcric nitrogra, 
~ p a n r i n r g p ; o r t i f i c i P l a i l k , 7 o ; o p c r t i n ~ p g ; ~ u m , g r p c r  
ant in r g p .  (E ,  Varga a d  L. M e n u  editors, NRW DPtrt for 
h n ' s  InrpmX~rn, p. 196, Wcn York, rw.) 
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Accordingly, judgments vary as ta w W  products may be 
considered cartelid. And so intricate are the cartel connections, so 
multitudinous their forms and devices, so w e n  and fluid the 
cartel relation, that it becomes almost impossible to f~ their number 
or estimate exactly the proportion of the world market under cartel 
controt Furthermore, even in the more highly developed and mort 
stable form the ad is a medium through which grcatcr trusti- 
&ation and inner conflict proceed simultaneously, bringing about 
qualitative change within the system. Such kctors would defy exact 
statistical mmsurerncnt, wen if all pminmt data wert available. 
Dcspict thest obstacles various attempts have k e n  made to 
cgtimatt the share of world trade dominated by the cartels. T h e  
&m are admittedly unsatishctary, far the reasons already set forth. 
Ntverthdess, while presenting an incomplttt picture, they are of 
vdue in indicating thc role of thc cartels in the world mark.  
One estimate made by Ervin Hmex place at 42.6 per cent the 
share of world trade in 1937 "dominated or considerably influenced 
by marketing controls." This figure includts inter-government corn- 
d t y  agreements as in whab m b k ,  sugar, tin, etc, some of 
which do not properly fall within the category of &. But ac- 
cording to the author's own dtfinition of "marketing controls" his 
figures primarily cover private cartel agreements, excluding, how- 
ever, arrangements of tbe patent-licensing type. Cartels in the m i c e  
industries, mreh as shipping and other trampomtion, communica- 
tions, insuxana, and banking arc necesmily excluded. W e  thy 
afiact txadc and play an important role in cartehation, this cannot 
bc cxprased in volume or value of trade. The result can herdore 
be considered a very minimum ~ s t i m a t e . ~  
Another admittedly exploratory study by Frederick Haussmann 
and Daniel Ahatn, employing a Mcrcnt approach and covering 
the perid 1~x937, arrived independcntiy at about the samt esti- 
mate+* They summark their tentative findings as follows: 
Their tstimate also incIudcs government mmnodi~ agmmcnts and 
&p duds EarPJs in the suvicc industries. But patent s g x e ~  
mcoh sffecting m a n u f a d  goods, are included. T h y  divide cortcIs 
into thm groups, a&g to the propMtion of the product d a d  
in worM trade: (a) -Is, in which arc indudcd all products m t r d J  
in world wade by p pu cent or more; (b) partial camlization, which 
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"Taking into account the inaccuracy of the dmatcd dw 
to the lack of exact statistics, we come to the basic conclusion that 
42 per cent of world trade between x p g  and 193 was carttlizcd 
or inaucnccd by loosely knit asmiations or conftrenccs. This 
is a minimum estimate. 
"To this eshatc, we add the r r q  per c a t  of world trade in- 
f l u 4  by trusts which were not connected with any cartels. 
Thus we can say that 53.7 p r  cent of the present total interm- 
t i d  trade was i&umcod by cartels or trusts. Trusrs and 
oligopolies by themstlves controlled, according to our estimate+ 
ag per a t  of world trackn " 
Thw tstimatq admittedly rough and incomplete, show that at 
a minimum 4 per cent of world trade is mttliztd. If to this is added 
tht share of world t x p  controlkd by trusts alone, without the 
h e f i t  of wtd agramenm, wdI ~ v c r  Adf of wwld d e  is em- 
frdkd d i r d y  by monopoly combs~~abions, 
Thip is a minimum statement of the case. Establishing the £act 
that monopolits and cartels contra1 an &=lute majority of the 
products entering world trade in itself does not tell the whole story. 
It is possible for a monopoly or a cartel to hold a decisive position 
in any given sphere of production and wade without actually con- 
prollhg directly more than half the output. If the remainder of rhc 
coven produas d a d  by Icds thaD 70 per ant; (c) codcream, by 
which is meant loosely knit d t i o n s  and conventions not necessarily 
involving formal agmmcnrs but which do impose some d - t p p c  rcgu- 
Iationa 7 3 ~ ~  tbrrt group taken togaher control p.3 p cent of world 
track (cads, za.3 per cent; pdd actdimtion, 5.3 pcr ant; conk- 
enas, 14.7 ptr cent). Included, but dispasod among all t k  group, 
arc products antroiled by "Cxusta, Combioed with Grdhb'' w b  
s h e  O£ world trade is separaacly estimatsd at 17.8 per ant. In addi- 
tion, another group of prodims arc M c d  as "Attempts at Cartdim 
tion"; this category, amounting to 6.3 pu cent of world trade, is not in- 
cluded ia the total cstjmau of 42.3 p cent. Still anathcr dadcation, 
"Trusts, Not Combid  with carthtion," cavering products amount- 
ing to r r q  pcr ctnt of wodd trade, is handhi s e p a d y  and is not in- 




The extent to which world urns arc p o d  
natc a sphere of trade witbout en 
mmts, the a c n t  to which they ha 
that the share of world trade controlid d i d y  by them 
at 1x4 per etnt. 
At the same time, the tremendous sector of world trade (+ lpet 
ant) controlled through the m d  emphasizes the txtmt of d ' 
cardimtion. The cartels arc not only channels though whkh M 
tnrsrs aeccise their domination over widu sectors; they are dd - 
the o e n d  points of contact4 tnux or of cot&-for the d . 
trusts t h d v w .  Thus the mpe of world anelkation on the e a  
of World War II indites, on the one hand, how fertile the pound 
had b e  for even p t c r  &cation, and, on the other, the 
extent to which &c cartels had bmmc the medium of she inter- 
m~~lopoly conflict as a whole. 
IV. PREWAR CARTEL STRUCTURE 
Allocation of markets is the central function of the international 
cart& Whatever the device used-asignm~ts of sales territory, a- 
port or production quotas, price agreements, patent trrchanp and 
licensing& allocation of markets is d i r d y  or indirectly involved, 
Without this, the d wqslld lose its significance as an instrument 
of industrial truce or regulated competition. 
The whole dynamic of world capitalist relations is registad in 
the allocation of markcts among the mel members. The rtal rela- 
tion of power is established in the division or redivision of markers. 
Such allmations are made in accordanm with thc relative strength 
of the ampanics or m a  participating in the -1. But the acmd 
s m n g t h  of the trusts, as well as their potential for further expansion, 
is determined by the relative position of their industry and tbdr 
whole nariond economy, as w d  as gcncrd political consideratiom 
I 
involving government pdicy and military powtr, BasicalIy, the caatl 
structure d e c t s  the whole complex of economic and political rela- 
tions among the main capitalist powers. This is not fully c x p d  in 
every scparatt cartel, or in every sphere of industry and trade. The 
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cartel structure rcacts very stnsitlvtly ta new economic d d o p  
ments within this or that industry, and txprases through its eonstant 
change and alterations the uneven and spasmodic nature of capitalist 
development or decay. But the structure as a whole at any givm 
ptriad presents a certain pattern of reIations corresponding to inter- 
imptriaEst and inter-monopoly relations as a wh& 
The world cartel s m ~ t u f t  which a r a  after World War I 
was built essentially around a b e w a y  relationship among tht 
monopolies of Germany, Britain and the United Statts. T h e  entire 
network of world cartels gravitated around this tripartite arrange- 
ment. Regionally, and m i d y  on a world scale, the monopolists 
of other lading countries played an important role, sometimw only 
as satcllitts of one or thc other of the big three cartel partners, at orher 
times in their own right. Thw France, through her own colonial 
empire and also in Europe, played an important c a d  role, as did to 
a lesser cxttat rhe monopolists of Bclgium, Holland, Sweden, and 
Italy. Representing a rising dominant pwcr in the Far East, and 
already commanding a well dcvdoped industria base at home, the 
Japancsc monopolists ah appeared as leading participants in a 
number of cards. 
In general terms, tbe interwar artel structure was determind 
by 'the following: (I) the r-gencc of Germany after her defeat 
in World War I as a leading imperialist power, largdy with the aid 
of American capid, to serve as the center of =pitalist stabhtion 
in Europe and as thc bastion against European revolution and Soviet 
~ ~ U U I C C ;  (2 )  the further rapid development of the Unitcd States as 
the leading industrial and financial power of the world, but as yet 
without having developed her full potential in a drive for world 
markets; and (3) the continued stagnation of Britain's industrial 
economy and the h e r  weakening of the Empire, so that she was 
obliged to defend her world position against German, American, 
and Japancsc encroachment rather than primarily to stek further 
-ion abroad. This general relation, presented htrc ody  in 
barest o u h  was the framework within which the cartel srructure 
t m k  shape after World War I. 
In the allmtion of markets among the three maia d pani- 
cipants, th general principIe &at prevailed was to rcservc the trt- 
mendous United Smta market for the Amcricanq while dividing 
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thc bulk of the rtmaindtr of the world market-with the usual UK- 
atption of Canada and Latin America--among the monopolists of 
Gumany, Britain, and their lesser partners. Canada and Latin 
Amaia in most ass were treated as markets to be jointly shared 
&idly by the British and American interests. From an analysis of 
the c a d  agreemmts found in the file of American firms by the 
Dcparemcat of Justice, Edwards draws the following coacIusion : 
"Sinet the primary interest of American participants- has 
conshcd in the enjoyment of an ua~hdcngcd position in the 
rich domestic market of the United States, and perhaps the 
Canadian market, they have usually k e n  willing to sacrifice 
possibiiti~ of export and investment abroad as the price of such 
a position. Similarly, foreign mmpanies havt k n  willing u, 
purchase protection in other markets by foregoing sales in the 
United States." " 
Naturally, this docs not establish tk rule for all tht foreign 
economic activities of American big business. The United States 
did emerge during this period as the leading exporter of both goods 
and capitd, raking over Britain's premier role in these spheres, and 
this shows that the American monopolists did more than mtrcly 
dominate the domestic market The powcrlul American trusts op- 
crating outside the m& as in &c auto and oil industries, as well 
as those participating in the c m l s ,  expanded their share of thc 
world market. If that share was not hgtr and failed to correspond 
to tht actud weight of the U n i d  Stam in tht world economy, this 
was due to other factors, such as thc economic and political crises of 
the interwar decades. Neverthtksq the general principle indimted 
by Edwards did apply in the artel$ and undoubtedly played a role 
in restricting American economic expansion abroad, as it did in 
hindering foreign petration into thc American home market. 
The monopolists of other countries were equally canccrned with pr+ 
p i n g  their own home markets and their positions abroad from 
M a n  encroachment, as the cartel agreements- and increasing 
gwtrnment import and export controls during this puiod demon- 
strate. ', 
A 6ew tmmpks will & to illustrate the general principle 
prevailing in the ahat ion of markets through the 
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The agreement between du Pont and Imperial Chemhls, ra- 
ntwed in 1939, @anted the American uust exclusive rights in the 
United S t a b  and Central Ameriea, wbile 1.C.I. retained the British 
Empire with the maption of Canada. They agreed to exploit thc 
Canadian, Brazilian, and Argentine markets througb jointly owned 
mbaidiarics. The rest of th worid was left open in the du Pont-I.CJ. 
apcmcntj for it was the subject of a separate agreement be- 
the British mst and I. G. Farhn. 
Tht pattern of the agreements cohrms to the general relations 
of the d u e t  main powers in the world economy. In Ccnual America, 
which the United States dominates, du Pont retained exclusive 
rights. The arrangements for Canada, Brazil, and Argentina re- 
k e d  the predominance of British and American economic pens 
tration into thest countries over that of Germany and o h r  powers. 
These arrangements also registered the fact that in the field of 
chtmicafs Ammian penetration was  h d y  smng enough to force 
the older British intermits in t k  countries to share the marktt by 
agreement. Leaving the remaining m 1 d  markets to the British and 
German interests indicates that in this particular industry the Ameri- 
can crust was not yet ready, or did not find it tssmlial, to extend 
on any major scak into broader fields. Of course, the card agree- 
ment in itself dots not tell the whole story. I. G. Farben had large 
direct interests in &c American &emid industry, as did du Pont, 
Standard Oil, and others in the German. But the allocation of 
markets in the wtcl pact doa rdkct the actual power relationship. 
A more direct form of the three-way allocation of markets is 
illustrated by the alkali cartel, as & in 1g3q. I. G. Farh 
together with its assaciated Belgian trust, Solvay, & a i d  exclusive 
rights to the European continent, while the American inmsts held 
d u s i v c  rights to North America (including Canada and Ceotral 
America), and I.C.I. main4 most British +ens and various 
other areas. The American producers and 1.C.L shared South h r -  
ica and tbc Dutch East India between them. It is interesting to note 
that in Argmtha the agrcunent recognized thc predominant p i -  
tion of Britain by apportioning ~5 per cent of that market ta LCJ., 
until 1936 when the American quota was r a i d  to 35 per cwt. 
Ratim vary from industry to industry, and even from ont p d -  
uct to' another. En the agreement on tungsten carbide, which pro- 
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I vides the bcst cutting edge for &e -Is, the German h p p  tTUst agreed not to sd in the United States in return for Gcncral ElccWs commitment not to a p o r t  the product. A similar agm- mat  prevded in the autogiro industry. The Autogiro Co. of Amer- ica, which held exclusive patents rights for the United States, agreed to l ave  the rest of the world to the Cierva Autogiro Co. of London, and the latter agreed to keep out of thc American market. An agreement still in effect at the outbreak of war in 1939 was made fourteen ycam earlier betwetn International General Electric 
Co., Radio Corp. of America, Westinghouse Electric International 
Co, and the N. V. Philips combine allocating markets for radio 
I 
equipment. Thc exclusive territory of the American group was de- 
b e d  as Canada and the United States, while Pbilips w a s  ganted 
exclusive rights to H o h d  (including thc DutGh empire), Czecho- 
slovakia, Denmark, Esthda, FinIand, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. 
In some c a w ,  a mu& larger share of the foreign market was 
granted the American interests. For example, in a pact governing 
moving-picture rewrding and reproducing apparatus between the 
Icading Amerimn concerns and the German and Dutch companies 
in 1930, the latter were given exclusive rights to eleven European 
countries and the Dutch East Indies, while the Americans received 
the United S ~ t c s ,  Canada, Australia, New Z d m d ,  India, the Straits 
Stttlcmcnts and the exclusive right to sell to the Soviet Union, Xn aa 
agreement on d i d  engine between G c n d  Electric and two Ger- 
man firms, the American eust obtained all countries outside of 
Europe and the Dutch colonie8. 
World War XI has rendered the allocation of markets under 
the prewar cartel system obsolete. While thue arc exceptions, and in 
a number of fields tht prt-war cartel pacts wiH undoubtedly be re 
sumed with some revism, in tht main the old market allocations 
no longer cormpad to tht new relationships merging from the 
war. 
The American monopolists are no longer satisfied with the a b  
cations pmailing bdore the war. The dtvelopmmt of the American 
war economy raising production capacity and tcehaique to a new 
high hd, and the weakening of the ottrer leading capitalist cow- 
& greatly improve the position of the American trusts in the world 
economy. They can be cxpectcd to drive energetically £or a r e  
allmrion of world mums and markets, in which thdr strength- 
d pi t ion  will be more fully registuad. 
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